RECENT CASES
Extradition (i9o3), ii. It has been enunciated in extradition cases under the treaty
applicable to the present case. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 Sup. Ct. 781, 47
L. Ed. 948 (I9O2); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 42 Sup. Ct. 469, 66 L. Ed. 965
(1921); Greene v. United States, i54 Fed. 4oi (C.C.A. 5th 1907); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51
F. (2d) 17 (C.C.A. 4 th 193'). It has been repeated in cases involving the same offence
as that charged in the principal case. Kelley v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 36 Sup. Ct. 487, 6o
L. Ed. 86i (1915); Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 36 Sup. Ct. 634, 60 L. Ed. 1136
(1915). The court here, advancing beyond previous decisions, refused to apply the
above principle on the ground that the treaty did not specifically require criminality in
both countries for the acts here alleged while it did require criminality in both countries
for other offenses. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 71 L. Ed.
793 (1926); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed.
845 (1927).
The treaty states that certain persons shall "be reciprocally delivered up." Great
Britain will not extradite unless the offense is a crime in Great Britain. Extradition
Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. C. 52, § 26, schedule i; Ex parte Piot, 15 Cox C.C. 208
(1883); Re Bellencoutre, 17 Cox C.C. 253 (i89r). The present holding seemingly deprives the treaty of its reciprocity, but this should not be a fatal objection to the
court's liberal construction. But see 32 Mich, L. Rev. 417 (1924), where the present
decision was interpreted to mean that since the offense was a crime in "most states"
the requirement of criminality in both countries was satisfied.
JosEPH TOBE ZOLINE

Taxation-Status of Government Lessees under "Instrumentality" Doctrine[Federal].--Defendant, lessee of oil and gas rights on municipal land used for water
supply and other civic purposes, sought exemption as a state instrumentality from a
federal tax on its share of the net income derived from the lease. The city received a
percentage of the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas removed, and defendant agreed
to pay for all development. The lower court allowed the exemption. On appeal, held,
the lessee's net income was taxable; it was remote from governmental function, and
the effect on the state's activities was inconsiderable. Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288
U.S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439, 77 L. Ed. 925 (I933).
The broad principle that an "instrumentality" of the government cannot be taxed
has been used to hold lessees of government prolrerty immune from taxation on the
income from the lease. The doctrine as thus applied is exemplified in the Gillespie case
where a state tax on the net income derived from a lease of restricted Indian land was
held invalid. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. Ed. 338 (1922).
The court reasoned that a lease of land dedicated to the support of a governmental
agency is an "instrumentality" of the government, that a tax on the lease is invalid
since it "is a tax upon the power to [lease] and could be used to destroy [that] power,"
and that therefore a tax on the income from the lease is likewise invalid. This doctrine
had been previously enunciated in Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gidf R.R. v. Harrison, 235
U.S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. Ed. 234 (1914), where the gross income derived from
coal mining under a lease of restricted Indian lands was held exempt from taxation on
the theory that the lessee was an agercy succeeding to the duties of the government,
notwithstanding the state's contention that it taxed only the coal at the pit's mouth
as personal property of the lessee. Cf. Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 36
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Sup. Ct. 453, 6o L. Ed. 779 (i9i6); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U.S. 549, 39 Sup. Ct.
183, 63 L. Ed. 416 (igIg).
Since the Gillespie case the tendency has been to limit the application of the rule
there announced. In Group No. i Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432, 75
L. Ed. 1032 (1931), a federal tax was sustained on income received by lessees of public

school land from the sale of oil produced thereon. The Gillespie case was distinguished
on the ground that by state law a lease operated to vest in the lessee the title to the
oil underground, and hence the income being taxed was derived from the sale of private
property. This distinction seems unsatisfactory, however, in view of the fact that title
to the oil in the GillesPiecase vested in the lessee on severance. See opinion of Stone,
3, dissenting, in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 401, 52 Sup. Ct. 443,
76 L. Ed. 815 (193). The latter case, though holding invalid a federal tax on the net
income from oil lands dedicated to the support of public schools and leased from the
state, conceded that the doctrine of the Gillespie case should be limited to "circumstances closely analogous." See Indian Territory Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S.
325, 53 Sup. Ct. 388, 77 L. Ed. 503 (i933); 33 Col. L. Rev. 1075 (i933). In the present

case the court reads into this dictum of the Coronado case the implication that before
the circumstances are sufficiently analogous to the Gillespie case, the lands involved
must be exclusively dedicated to the support of a definite and strictly governmental
purpose.
The Gillespie case rests on the premise that a lessee of lands from which a government derives income for its governmental functions becomes thereby an instrumentality of that government. Clearly, however, a lessee is not an instrumentality -in the
sense that he is an active participant in a governmental function. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (ixi8); South Carolinav. U.S., 199 U.S.
437, 26 Sup. Ct. I1o, 5o L. Ed. 261 (i9o5). A lessee is conducting an essentially private
enterprise. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 24 L. Ed. 313 (1876); Wells v. Savannah, 18i
U.S. 531, 21 Sup. Ct. 697, 45 L. Ed. 986 (igoo); Garland County v. Gaines, 56 Ark. 227,
19 S.W. 602 (1892); LaSalle County Mfg. Co. v. Ottawa, i6 Ill. 418 (3855); Moeller v.
Gormley, 44 Wash. 465, 87 Pac. 507 (1907). Moreover, the income from the sale of an

article which is personal property of the vendor at the time of the sale has always been
a legitimate subject of taxation. Alderman v. Wells, 85 S.C. 507, 67 S.E. 781 (90io);

Ex rel. Chandlerv. French,73 W.Va. 658, 8i S.E. 825 (1915). For purposes of taxation,
income as such has been classified as a separate entity regardless of its source, and
without relation to any particular property or business. Tyle Realty Co. v. Andrews,
240 U.S. 115, 36 Sup. Ct. 281, 6o L. Ed. 554 (i915); Black, Income Tax (2d ed. 191),
§ 187. And even if the lessee were in fact an agency of the government, "no constitutional implications prohibit a state tax upon the property of an agent of the government merely because it is the property of such agent," Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18
Wall. (U.S.) 5, 33, 21 L. Ed. 787 (1873).
In view of the dubious foundation of the Gillespie case, and of the immunity from
state and federal taxation it grants to large private incomes, it would seem more desirable to follow the suggestion of the dissenting justices in Burnet v. CoronadoOil Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 401, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. Ed. 815 (i931), and overrule the Gillespie
case, rather than follow the method of the present case of limiting it by tenuous distinction which will lead to further litigation.
WILLIAm L.
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